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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 89-0473-CA 
vs. : 
Category 14b 
JOHN M. FRY and 
JUDITH L. FRY, 
Defendants/Third-party 
Plaintiffs/Appellants. : 
vs. : 
WILLIAM C. PETERSEN, : 
Third-party Defendant. : 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment in a civil case. The 
Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1989). The case was transferred to this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1989) , and this Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court err in directing a verdict for the 
plaintiff passenger, where the defendant had stipulated that the 
plaintiff was not negligent, the trial court had previously 
directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff's driver based on the 
uncontroverted evidence, and the accident was not one which would 
happen in the absence of negligence? 
2. If this Court determines that the trial court did err, 
should this case be remanded for a new trial on negligence only 
where the trial court determined that there was no substantial 
competent evidence to support the jury's verdict, the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence established that Fry was negligent, and the 
jury was confused? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-73 (1981), amended by Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-73 (1988), as in effect at the time of the accident, provided 
as follows: 
The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to 
the left within an intersection or into an 
alley, private road, or driveway shall yield 
the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching 
from the opposite direction which is within the 
intersection or so close to the turning vehicle 
as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
The provisions of Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
are set forth in the Appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a civil action to recover 
for personal injuries incurred in an automobile accident alleged 
to have been caused by defendants1 negligence. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. The 
accident in question occurred on December 11, 1982. (Tr.1 11-28-
^itations to those portions of the record which were repagina-
ted by the trial court clerk in accordance with Rule 11(b) of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals will be to "R. [page number]." 
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88 p. 47.) Plaintiff filed his complaint on August 12, 1983, 
initially naming as defendants John M. Fry and his mother, Judith 
L. Fry. The complaint alleged that John M. Fry (hereinafter "Fry") 
negligently drove the pick-up he was driving into the path of the 
automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger. The complaint 
further alleged that Judith L. Fry signed the driver's license 
application of John M. Fry, who was a minor at the time of the 
accident, and was accordingly liable for his negligence pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-10 (1981) , amended by Utah Code Ann. § 41-
2-115 (1988) . 
Defendants Fry subsequently filed a third-party complaint 
naming William C. Petersen (hereinafter "Petersen"), the driver of 
the automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger, as a third-party 
defendant. (R. 90-95.) Plaintiff thereafter amended his complaint 
to also state a claim against Petersen for negligence. (R. 142-
45.) 
The case was tried before a jury commencing November 28, 1988. 
(R. 374-86.) Petersen reserved the right to make motions at the 
close of plaintiff's case (Tr. 11-29-88 p. 102), and at the end of 
Fry's case, (R. 500), and at an appropriate time made a motion for 
directed verdict as against both plaintiff and Fry. (Tr. 11-29-88 
Only one portion of the transcript was so paginated, that of the 
testimony of Dr. Rudolph Limpert on the second day of trial, November 
29, 1988. The balance of the transcript will be cited by date and 
page number, e.g., "Tr. 11-29-88 p. ." 
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p. 190.) After considering arguments of counsel, Petersen's motion 
was granted. (Id. p. 197.) 
Plaintiff moved for a directed verdict that plaintiff had no 
comparative negligence. All parties stipulated to the motion, and 
it was granted. (Id. p. 197.) 
Plaintiff also made an oral motion for a directed verdict that 
Fry was negligent. (Id.) The motion was preliminarily denied (Id. 
p. 198), and renewed the following morning in writing. (R. 292; 
Tr. 11-30-88 p. 3.) After arguments, the trial court took the 
motion under advisement. (Tr. 11-30-88 p. 9.) 
Fry requested, and the court rejected, a jury instruction on 
"unavoidable accident." (R. 324; Tr. 11-30-88 p. 46.) The case 
was submitted to the jury on a special verdict, but the jury was 
instructed to answer questions relating to the amount of plain-
tiff's damages regardless of its verdict on negligence. (Tr. 11-
30-88 p. 49.) 
The jury found that Fry was not negligent. (R. 303-04.) The 
trial court thereafter granted plaintiff's motion for a directed 
verdict, which had been taken under advisement during the trial. 
(R. 424-30.) The trial court subsequently entered formal Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 448-54) , and a Judgment (R. 455-
56). Fry filed his appeal on May 15, 1989. (R. 457-58.) 
C. Statement of Facts. The accident giving rise to this 
action occurred shortly after 8:00 p.m. on December 11, 1982, at 
the intersection of 1300 South and Main Street in Orem, Utah. (Tr. 
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11-28-88 p. 47; Tr. 11-29-88 p. 8.) The road on which both 
vehicles were traveling, 1300 South, is the main arterial road 
leading from the 1-15 freeway to the University Mall in Orem, Utah. 
(A diagram of the intersection appears in the Appendix.) Plaintiff 
was a passenger in a Volkswagen "bug" driven by William Petersen. 
Petersen and plaintiff were on a double date; plaintiff and his 
date were seated in the back seat, and Petersen and his date in the 
front seat. (Tr. 11-29-88 p. 6.) The Volkswagen was proceeding 
east along 1300 South at a speed less than the speed limit.2 There 
was no evidence of any lane changes by the Volkswagen. (Tr. 11-
29-88 pp. 125, 133. See also Tr. 11-28-88 p. 64, Tr. 11-29-88 p. 
29.) The Volkswagen was travelling in the right-hand (South) lane 
of the road. (Tr. 11-28-88 p. 58; tr. 11-29-88 p. 122.) The road 
at that point had two east-bound lanes plus a left-turn lane. 
(Exs. 1 & 10, copies in appendix; Tr. 11-30-88 pp. 16-17.) The 
roads were clear and dry, and although it was dark, the street 
lights were on and visibility was clear. (Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 7, 32-
33; Tr. 11-28-88 pp. 48-49.) The headlights on the Volkswagen 
were on. (Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 24, 132, 140.) 
2Rudolph Limpert, who testified for Fry, estimated the speed of 
the Volkswagen at 44 to 48 miles per hour prior to application of the 
brakes, and 30 to 35 miles per hour at the point of impact. (R. 487-
88, 493.) Greg DuVal, who testified for plaintiff, estimated the 
speed of the Volkswagen at 38 miles per hour prior to braking, and 
25 miles per hour on impact. (Tr. 11-30-88 p. 26.) Petersen did 
not recall what speed he was going. (Id. p. 36.) The speed limit 
was 55 mph. (Tr. 11-28-88 p. 55.) 
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John M. Fry, 16 years old at the time of the accident, was 
also on a date. (Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 31-32.) He thought he was on 
the road to the Orem Recreation Center, but was about 17 blocks off 
course. (Tr. 11-28-88 p. 56.) His vehicle was proceeding west on 
1300 South and turned left through the intersection and into the 
path of the Volkswagen. (Tr. 11-29-88 p. 123.) The Volkswagen 
left 35' 11" of skid marks in the right-hand travel lane (Tr. 11-
28-88 p. 55; Ex. 2), but still collided with sufficient force to 
cause the Volkswagen to spin around and to knock all four occupants 
of the Volkswagen unconscious. (Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 9, 56, 132.) 
Only one of the four occupants in the Volkswagen had any memory of 
the accident itself, and that was Becky Jones, Petersen's date. 
Her only recollection was that she was turned around talking to 
plaintiff and his date when she felt Petersen slam on his brakes. 
She turned forward and saw the pick-up in front of the Volkswagen 
just as the collision occurred. (Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 131-32.) 
Fry and his date similarly had little memory of the accident. 
Fry testified (plaintiff disputed this testimony) that he had been 
stopped at a red light prior to entering the intersection, and when 
the light turned green, he looked for on-coming traffic, saw none, 
and proceeded to make his turn. (Tr. 11-29-88 p. 105.) He further 
testified that his vision was obstructed by a brown station wagon 
which was in the eastbound left turn lane and proceeding to turn 
left. (Id.) He also testified, however, that after making his 
initial visual check for on-coming vehicles and starting to make 
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his turn, he did not again look for traffic in the eastbound lanes. 
Fry further acknowledged that his pickup sat "considerably higher 
off the road11 than the station wagon. (Tr. 11-29-88 P. 44.) 
The impact occurred in the southern most lane when Fry was 
nearly through the intersection (Tr. 11-29-88 p. Ill), a distance 
of over 50 feet from where he began his turn (Tr. 11-30-88 p. 26) .3 
It would have taken Fry approximately five to six seconds to travel 
through the intersection. (Tr. 11-29-88 p. 169.) Fry nonetheless 
unequivocally testified that he only looked for on-coming traffic 
prior to starting his turn and did not look again at any point 
during the turn. (Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 41, 46, 105.) 
Plaintiff suffered severe and permanent injuries in the 
accident, and has a 15% permanent partial disability as a result 
of the injuries. (Tr. 11-28-88 p. 161.) He has and continues to 
experience considerable low back pain, with the result that he 
cannot participate in sporting and other activities as he used to, 
and is limited in his abilities to work and lift objects. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Accidents don't just happen. They are either caused by cir-
cumstances beyond control of the individuals involved, i.e., they 
are unavoidable accidents, or they are caused by the negligence of 
3This is not different from the testimony of Rudolph Limpert. 
Dr. Limpert testified that the pick-up traveled approximately 28.5 
feet from the moment that Petersen would have perceived the pick-up. 
(R. 495.) Limpert gave no testimony concerning the total distance 
that Fry traveled across the intersection. 
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one or more persons. The accident in this case does not fit within 
the definition of "unavoidable accident" established by prior 
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court. It follows that the accident 
was the result of the negligence of some person. The trial court 
held, based on the undisputed evidence, that neither plaintiff nor 
Petersen, the driver of the automobile in which plaintiff was a 
passenger, were negligent. The only other potential cause of the 
accident was the negligence of defendant Fry. Having previously 
held as a matter of law that neither plaintiff nor Petersen was 
negligent, and where the accident was not unavoidable, the court 
was required to direct a verdict of negligence against Fry. 
The trial court was further, based on the evidence presented 
at trial, required to direct a verdict of negligence against Fry. 
Even viewed in the light most favorable to Fry, the evidence 
established that Fry commenced a left turn in a very large inter-
section when he knew his vision of on-coming traffic was blocked, 
and did not look for on-coming traffic except when he first 
commenced his turn. It was obvious that Peterson, who had the 
right of way, had seen Fry, because he slammed on his brakes in an 
attempt to avoid the accident. Reasonable minds could not differ 
in finding that Fry could have seen Peterson if he had looked, and 
that Fry did not exercise the due care required by statute of an 
individual making a left turn. 
As an alternative, if this Court determines that the trial 
court erred in granting a directed verdict, this case should be 
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remanded for a new trial on the issue of negligence only. The 
findings made by the trial court in granting plaintiff's Motion for 
Directed Verdict establish that there was no substantial competent 
evidence to support the verdict, it was contrary to the overwhelm-
ing weight of the evidence, and the jury was confused. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ACCIDENT WAS NOT "UNAVOIDABLE," AND 
HENCE WAS THE RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF 
SOME PERSON. 
Utah decisions have recognized a class of accidents which are 
"unavoidable": 
It is obvious that there are some accidents, i.e., 
unusual and unexpected occurrences, which result in 
injury and which happen without any one failing to 
exercise reasonable care; and when this is so the 
accident is properly classified as unavoidable 
insofar as legal causation or the imposition of 
liability is concerned. 
Woodhouse v. Johnson, 20 Utah 2d 210, 436 P.2d 442, 445 (1968) 
(footnotes omitted). The same concept has also been expressed as 
follows: 
If either party can avoid an accident by the 
exercise of proper care, it cannot be said to 
be unavoidable. The issue of unavoidable 
accident arises only where the evidence shows 
that the accident happened from an unknown or 
unforeseen cause or in an unexplainable manner 
which circumstances rebut the defendant's 
alleged negligence. 
Strincrham v. Broderick, 529 P.2d 425, 426 (Utah 1974). 
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The converse of this concept is that other accidents (those 
which are not unavoidable) are the result of the negligence of some 
person.4 Application of this concept was illustrated in the 
Florida case of Davis v. Sobik's Sandwich Shops, Inc., 351 So. 2d 
17 (Fla. 1977) . The plaintiff in that case, as in the instant one, 
"was an innocent passenger, free of any contributory negligence." 
351 So. 2d at 18. The court held that where there was no evidence 
to indicate that the injury was the result of an unavoidable 
accident, and where there was no evidence that the accident was 
caused by anyone not joined in the action, the only possible 
conclusion was that one or more of the defendants was at fault. 
The court held that "the state of the evidence would require a new 
trial if petitioner failed to recover against at least one of the 
4This assertion is not contrary to King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 
(Utah 1987), nor to McCloud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1977), both 
of which are cited on page 15 of Fry's brief for the proposition that 
"a collision alone does not create an inference of negligence." The 
plaintiff in King was injured when her car was rear-ended by the 
defendant in heavy traffic. The plaintiff in McCloud was injured as 
he was traveling straight through an intersection on his motorcycle 
and was struck by the defendant's car, which came from the opposite 
direction and was turning left. In each case, the plaintiff was 
found to be 100% at fault. The cases stand only for the proposition 
that an inference of negligence may not be based solely upon the 
position or role of the drivers in the accident (i.e., the following 
car in a rear-end collision is not always at fault, nor is the left-
turning car in an intersection collision always at fault). The 
plaintiff in each case was clearly negligent, so the cases did not 
address, and did not decide, the question of whether the mere 
occurrence of a collision creates an inference that some person was 
negligent, in absence of evidence that the collision was "unavoid-
able." 
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defendants. A verdict for all the defendants was legally precluded 
by the evidence." 351 So. 2d at 18-19. 
Each of these factors is present in the instant case. The 
accident was not unavoidable. Fry's expert, Rudolph Limpert, did 
characterize the accident as "unfortunate" (R. 497) , and did opine 
that Fry had not done anything unreasonable, but that does not 
establish that the accident was "unavoidable." The "unfortunate" 
circumstance identified by Dr. Limpert was that of the alleged 
station wagon in the left hand turn lane opposite from Fry, and 
which Fry claimed blocked his view of the Volkswagen. Having one's 
view blocked by another vehicle when wanting to make a left hand 
turn is certainly not a rare or uncommon occurrence. The accident 
could have been avoided by Fry waiting until the station wagon 
completed its turn before starting his turn, or by Fry continuing 
to look for on-coming vehicles during the course of his turn. The 
accident was not unavoidable as that term has been defined by the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
The instant case, therefore, presents a set of circumstances 
different from the cases relied upon by Fry. The accident was not 
unavoidable. Fry stipulated that plaintiff was not negligent. 
The trial court held, and Fry has not appealed that determination, 
that Petersen was not negligent. There was no claim that the 
accident was caused by any other person. The only possible 
remaining conclusion is that the accident was caused by Fry. The 
trial court properly directed a verdict against Fry. 
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POINT II 
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT FRY WAS NOT 
NEGLIGENT. 
The standard to be applied by this court in reviewing the 
trial court's directed verdict is whether there was "substantial 
competent evidence" which would have supported a jury verdict that 
Fry was not negligent. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 
414, 418 (Utah 1989) (quoting In re Estate of Kesler, 701 P.2d 86, 
95 (Utah 1985) ) . See also First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. 
Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Utah 1989). "Substantial 
evidence" has been defined as follows: 
Substantial evidence is more than a mere 
scintilla of evidence though something less 
than the weight of the evidence. Substantial 
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reason-
able mind might accept as adequate to support 
a conclusion. 
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
No "substantial competent evidence" was presented in the 
instant case which would support a jury finding that Fry was not 
negligent. Although the evidence was conflicting in many par-
ticulars, certain facts were not disputed. The night was clear, 
the roads were dry, and, although it was night, the street lights 
were on and visibility was clear. The Volkswagen in which plain-
tiff was a passenger was in good operating condition, and its 
headlights were on. The Volkswagen had the right of way and was 
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traveling at a speed well below the posted speed limit. The 
Volkswagen was traveling in the center lane of the three eastbound 
lanes and did not make any sudden lane changes immediately prior 
to the collision. In summary, there was absolutely no evidence, 
and the trial court properly so held, of any negligence or improper 
driving by Petersen, the driver of the car in which plaintiff was 
a passenger. Petersen had a right to be where he was and driving 
in the manner he was at the time of the accident. 
The evidence further established, without dispute, that Fry 
did not have the right of way. Fry intended to turn left across 
three lanes of traffic in an area where the posted speed limit was 
55 miles per hour. According to Fry's testimony, he looked for on-
coming traffic while his own pickup was stopped for a red light, 
but his view of on-coming traffic was at least partially obstructed 
by a station wagon in the eastbound left-turn lane. When the light 
turned green, Fry looked once, did not see any on-coming traffic, 
and proceeded to turn. He traveled approximately 56 feet, taking 
approximately five to six seconds, before reaching the point of 
impact. After his initial visual check prior to starting his turn, 
he did not again even glance to see if there was any oncoming 
traffic from the eastbound lanes. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-73 (1981), amended by Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-73 (1988), as in effect at the time of the accident, provided 
as follows: 
The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to 
the left within an intersection or into an 
13 
alley, private road, or driveway shall yield 
the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching 
from the opposite direction which is within the 
intersection or so close to the turning vehicle 
as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
Fry violated this section, and was therefore negligent. Fry 
acknowledges that there are prior Utah decisions where a plaintiff 
has lost at trial against a left-turning driver, and has attempted 
on appeal to establish that the left-turning driver was negligent 
as a matter of law, and that the jury decisions have been affirmed. 
In each of these cases, however, there was evidence that the 
plaintiff was also negligent. For example, in Smith v. Gallegos, 
16 Utah 2d 344, 400 P.2d 570 (1965), Smith was a passenger in a 
vehicle driven by Jones which turned left at an intersection into 
the path of Gallegos, who was traveling straight through the 
intersection. Smith prevailed at trial, and Gallegos appealed, 
claiming that Jones was contributorily negligent as a matter of law 
because he had failed to yield the right of way. The Supreme Court 
affirmed, holding that Jones was entitled to assume, in determining 
whether an on-coming vehicle constituted an immediate hazard, that 
other drivers were not negligent. The evidence showed that 
Gallegos was exceeding the speed limit, had accelerated just before 
or while going through the intersection, and may have suddenly 
switched lanes just before the intersection. The court, therefore, 
held that there was some evidence to support the jury's verdict 
that Jones was not negligent in failing to yield to Gallegos. 
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Of similar effect is Gibbons v. Orem City Corp., 27 Utah 2d 
184, 493 P.2d 1280 (1972), which also involved the question of 
whether a left-turning plaintiff was contributorily negligence as 
a matter of law. The defendant in Gibbons was exceeding the speed 
limit, and the court accordingly affirmed the jury verdict of no 
contributory negligence. 
Another example is McCloud v. Baum, 569 P. 2d 1125 (Utah 1977). 
The plaintiff was traveling straight through the intersection and 
was struck by a car turning left. The jury found the plaintiff 
100% at fault. The evidence showed, however, that the plaintiff 
was exceeding the speed limit and had swerved around a camper and 
into the opposing traffic lane just before entering the inter-
section. 
In each of the foregoing cases, the court has allowed the jury 
to excuse the left-turning driver's failure to yield where the 
driver with the right of way was guilty of some negligent or 
improper conduct. No such circumstance existed in the instant 
case. Where Petersen was not negligent, reasonable minds could 
not differ on whether Fry negligently failed to yield the right of 
way. To hold otherwise would be to hold that left-turning drivers 
whose view of on-coming traffic is obscured may nonetheless forge 
boldly ahead without regard to what perils may await. 
Such a concept has been previously criticized and rejected by 
the Utah Supreme Court under circumstances where the victim and the 
victim's driver were not negligent. In French v. Utah Oil Refining 
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Co, , 117 Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002 (1950), for example, the plaintiff 
turned left in an intersection in front of the defendant's truck. 
The trial court directed a verdict that the plaintiff was con-
tributor ily negligent for having failed to yield the right of way. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed and stated as follows: 
Regardless of his exact position, plaintiff saw 
the truck some 120 feet away from him prior to 
the time he entered the west lane of traffic 
and never again noticed it until just prior to 
the crash or until it was 6 feet from the point 
of impact. 
216 P.2d at 1003. 
Several other decision have also considered and rejected the 
contention that a driver may ignore hazards obscured by other 
vehicles. E.cr. , Richards v. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P. 2d 59 
(1959); Hughes v. Hooper, 19 Utah 2d 389, 431 P.3d 983 (1967). 
When faced with the situation of a non-negligent victim and 
a defendant who has violated the statute, the courts have not 
hesitated to direct a verdict of negligence. Henderson v. Meyer, 
533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975); Solt v. Godfrey, 25 Utah 2d 210, 479 P.2d 
474 (1971). 
By holding that Petersen was not negligent, the trial court 
thereby held that he was doing what he had a right to do and was 
where he had a right to be. It follows that Fry had a duty to 
yield to him, and was negligent, as a matter of law, for failing 
to do so. There was no substantial competent evidence to the 
contrary. This Court must affirm the directed verdict. 
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POINT III 
AS AN ALTERNATIVE, PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED 
TO A REMAND FOR A NEW TRIAL ON NEGLIGENCE ONLY. 
Plaintiff has established above that the judgment of the trial 
court should be affirmed in all respects. In the event, however, 
that this Court determines to reverse the trial court's directed 
verdict, this Court should remand for a new trial on negligence 
only, or alternatively, remand it to allow the plaintiff to file 
a motion for new trial to be considered by the trial court. 
In connection with its granting of plaintiff's Motion for a 
Directed Verdict, the trial court entered specific Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. It is evident from those Findings that the 
trial court concluded that the overwhelming weight of the evidence 
showed that Fry was negligent, and that there was insufficient 
evidence to justify a verdict for Fry. Insufficiency of the 
evidence to justify the verdict is grounds for a new trial. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6). The trial court in essence concluded, as did 
the Utah Supreme Court in Solt v. Godfrey, 25 Utah 2d 210, 479 P.2d 
474 (1971), that "[u]nder the evidence given in this case, it is 
difficult to see how the jury could have found for the defendant 
unless they were misled by some instructions given by the Court." 
479 P.2d at 476. 
In the event that this Court determines to reverse the trial 
court's directed verdict, therefore, this Court should remand this 
case for a new trial on the negligence issues. 
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A retrial on liability only is proper where, as in this case, 
there is no claim of any error in the damage phase of the trial 
and the issues of liability and damages were not intermingled. 
Groen v. Tri-O-Inc. , 667 P.2d 598, 607 n.ll (Utah 1983). See also 
Annot. Grant of new trial on issue of liability alone without 
retrial of issue of damages, 34 A.L.R. 2d 988 (1954). 
It would follow, if retrial is on negligence only, that 
interest on the judgment should continue to accrue, because the 
amount of plaintiff's loss has now been fixed with mathematical 
accuracy. Joraensen v. John Clay & Co., 660 P.2d 229, 233 (Utah 
1983) . 
As an alterative, if this Court determines not to remand for 
a new trial, the Court should nonetheless specifically state that 
the trial court, on remand, may consider any motion for new trial 
filed by plaintiff within ten days of entry of a judgment on the 
original jury verdict. Such a clarification is necessary because 
of the unique procedural context in which the trial court granted 
plaintiff's Motion for a Directed Verdict. 
Plaintiff's Motion for a Directed Verdict was made pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 50(a). (The full text of Rule 50 is reproduced 
in the Appendix.) Plaintiff made his motion at the close of Fry's 
evidence, and the court took the motion under advisement. Sub-
division (b) of Rule 50 contemplates that where a motion for a 
directed verdict is made and not granted, and the jury thereafter 
renders a verdict adverse to the moving party, the moving party may 
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then file a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and 
may include an alternative motion for new trial. The rule further 
provides that the trial court may grant the judgment notwith-
standing the verdict and also make a conditional ruling on the 
motion for new trial, which ruling becomes operative if the 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict is reversed on appeal. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 50(c). 
Plaintiff did not follow this procedure in the instant case, 
however, because no judgment on the verdict was ever entered. A 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict must be made within 
"ten days after entry of judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b). No 
judgment adverse to plaintiff was entered in this case, and there 
was, therefore, no point at which plaintiff could properly have 
made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and an 
alternative motion for new trial. 
In the event this Court reverses the trial court's judgment 
and does not remand for a new trial, this Court should at least 
specifically state that the plaintiff may make a motion for new 
trial within ten days after entry of the judgment on the verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
There was no substantial competent evidence to support the 
jury verdict in favor of Fry, and the trial court properly directed 
a verdict and entered a judgment for plaintiff. The judgment 
should be affirmed in all respects. 
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If this Court does not affirm the judgment, the case should 
be remanded for a new trial on negligence only, with interest to 
accrue on the judgment pending retrial. Alternatively, this Court 
should remand with directions that the plaintiff may file a motion 
for new trial within ten days after entry of the judgment on the 
jury verdict. 
DATED this 16th day of February, 1990. 
F&ED D./MOW 
/LESLI^/W. s: 
7ARD and "^ 
SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARt), LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 16th 
day of February, 1990. 
Scott W. Christensen, Esq. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
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ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN M. FRY and JUDITH L. FRY, 
Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WILLIAM C PETERSEN, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 64,555 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing before the Court sitting with 
a jury on November 28-30, 1988, and after a good faith presentation of the available 
evidence by both the plaintiff and the defendants; and the Court having heard the 
Motion of plaintiff's counsel for a directed verdict and having thereafter received 
memoranda of points and authorities by the respective attorneys in support of and in 
opposition to said Motion, and the jury having heretofore resolved the question of 
damages regarding plaintiff's injuries herein, and the Court having taken said Motion 
under advisement, and thereafter having heard oral arguments regarding said Motion, 
and being fully advised in the premises, the Court concludes that all the evidence 
showed defendant William C. Peterson was not negligent and that John M. Fry was 
negligent; and does, therefore, grant Plaintiff's Motion for Directed Verdict; and it 
does now make and enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about December 11, 1982, the defendant John M. Fry was driving 
a 1979 Chevrolet CIO pickup truck which was involved in a collision with a 1966 two-
door Volkswagen driven by third-party defendant William C. Petersen. The accident 
occurred at the intersection of State Road 265 and Main Street in Orem, Utah at 
approximately 6:22 p.m. The intersection was regulated by traffic lights. 
2. The plaintiff Harold Edwin Rhodes was a passenger in the vehicle driven 
by third-party defendant William C. Petersen. Upon impact, the occupants of the 
Petersen vehicle were all rendered unconscious from the accident and have limited 
memory of the circumstances occurring at the time of the accident. 
3. Prior to the collision, the Fry vehicle was traveling westbound on State 
Road 265, and the Petersen vehicle was travelling eastbound. Defendant Fry testified 
that he brought his vehicle to a stop at the intersection while he faced a red light. 
When the light turned green, he perceived a station wagon approaching that was going 
to make a left turn. Defendant Fry stated he did not see the Petersen vehicle and, 
therefore, proceeded to turn to the left across the eastbound lane of travel of the 
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Petersen vehicle. In an attempt to avoid defendant Fry's vehicle as it turned in front 
of Petersen's vehicle, Petersen applied the brakes and his vehicle laid down 35 feet 11 
inches of tire skid marks before the point of impact between the two vehicles. (See 
Exhibits 2 and 10.) 
4. The Court finds from the testimonies of the investigating officer, Fran 
Fillmore, and accident ^constructionists, Newell Knight and Greg DuVal, that defen-
dant Fry was negligent. 
5. John M. Fry's expert accident reconstructionist, Rudolph Limpert, stated 
on direct examination when asked: "Based on your experience in accident investigation 
and reconstruction, what caused this accident?": 
A set of unfortunate circumstances, a vehicle driving 
behind a station wagon, a large domestic or American 
station wagon that's some distance behind. One could 
calculate how small that Volkswagen is in relationship to 
the perspective of that big car, the station wagon 
obstructing its view. And then the unfortunate accident 
"occurred. So I don't see anything unreasonable in terms 
of the left turn by Mr. Fry when he made the left turn. 
(Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Testimony of Rudolph Limpert, November 29, 
1988, 2:10 p.m. transcribed p. 30.) 
6. The Court notes that the jury by Special Verdict found defendant John 
M. Fry not negligent. The jury finding, together with the Court's instruction to the 
jury, that the plaintiff was not negligent as stipulated by the parties and further, that 
the Court had found as a matter of law defendant Petersen was not negligent, resulted 
in what would have to be termed an unavoidable accident. The Court had refused to 
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give an unavoidable accident instruction. The jury further found plaintiff Harold E. 
Rhodes incurred $21,000.00 in special damages and $29,000.00 in general damages. 
7. Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-73, which was submitted as Jury Instruction No. 
23, states: 
The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left 
shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching 
from the opposite direction which is so close to the 
turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
8. This Court finds that Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-73, is applicable to the 
case at bar and creates a statutory duty on all operators of motor vehicles who make 
left hand turns to ". . . yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the 
opposite direction which is so close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an im-
mediate hazard." 
9. This Court also follows the ruling in French v. Utah Oil Ref. Co.. 117 
Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002, 1004 (1950) wherein the Utah Supreme Court held: 
. . . a burden is placed on the driving making the turn as 
he has control of the situation, and if there is a reason-
able probability that the movement cannot be made in 
safety then the disfavored driver should yield. The driver 
proceeding straight ahead has little opportunity to know a 
vehicle is to be turned across his path until the movement 
is commenced and in many instances, the warning is too 
late for the latter driver to take effective action. 
10. The Court also adheres to the rationale of Yeates v. Budge. 122 Utah 
518, 252 P.2d 220 (1953) wherein the Utah Supreme Court held that where a defendant 
attempted to turn across the path of the plaintiff, when he was only 40 feet away, the 
trial court could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff was so close as to constitute an 
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immediate hazard and that the defendant should have yielded the right-of-way to him. 
11. This Court is reluctant to take from the jury its fact finding respon-
sibility regarding negligence of the parties and whether the negligence was a proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries. The Court is mindful of those cases in which the Supreme 
Court has concluded that juries should be fact finders. (Mel Hardman Productions. Inc. 
v. Robinson. 604 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1979).) 
12. The Court, however, given all the testimony of the witnesses, finds that 
the matter is one in which reasonable minds could not differ, and in fairness and 
equity, cannot find that this accident was an unavoidable accident. The Utah Supreme 
Court has defined an unavoidable accident as *\ . . an unusual and unexpected occur-
rence 'which resultfs] in injury and which happen[s] without anyone failing to exercise 
reasonable care . . ." (Kusv v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corporation. 681 P.2d 1232, 1237 
(Utah 1984); and Stringham v. Broderick. 529 P1.2d 425, 426 (Utah 1974). 
13. Even should this Court ignore the testimony of those witnesses who 
testified that defendant Fry was negligent and look only to the testimony of Fry's 
witness, Rudy Limpert, (according to his calculations this was an unfortunate accident), 
this Court is of the opinion that the accident was not an unavoidable accident as 
defined by the Supreme Court of this state, 
14. The Court finds that given all the evidence reasonable men could not 
differ in finding that the defendant John M. Fry made a left hand turn across on-
coming traffic heading eastbound along State Road 265 and did not keep a proper 
lookout for eastbound on-coming traffic which resulted in his colliding with third-party 
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defendant William C. Petersen's vehicle, thus violating his statutory duty pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-73. 
15. The Court also finds that the jury was confused in its application of the 
jury instructions to the facts of the case by essentially concluding the collision to be 
an unavoidable accident. 
16. The Court further finds that plaintiff Harold Edwin Rhodes is entitled to 
his directed verdict against defendants holding that defendant John M. Fry negligently 
operated his vehicle which was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 
17. The Court finds that at the time of the accident, December 11, 1982, 
John M. Fry was the operator of a vehicle as a minor under 18 years of age; and this 
his mother, Judith L. Fry, signed John M Fry's driver's license application. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that the plaintiff Harold Edwin (Hal) Rhodes was 
not negligent. 
2. The Court concludes that the third-party defendant William C. Petersen 
was not negligent. 
3. The Court concludes that reasonable minds could not differ regarding the 
liability of the defendant and third-party plaintiff John M. Fry and concludes the same 
to be negligent and that said negligence was the proximate cause of the accident in 
question and of plaintiff's injuries. 
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4. The Court concludes that by law, liability of John M Fry is imputed to 
defendant and third-party plaintifff Judity L. Fry under Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-115(2). 
5. The Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against 
defendants John M. Fry and Judith L. Fry in the amount of $21,000.00 for special 
damages, together with accrued interest on said special damages from the date of the 
subject accident, December 11, 1982, until the date of judgment, at the rate of eight 
percent (8%), and for general damages in the amount of $29,000.00, with interest to 
accrue on the total judgment at the rate of twelve percent per annum (12%), plus court 
costs thereafter. 
DATED this / day of Ap*t£ 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
BOYD L. PARK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to 
the following, postage prepaid, this _$Lday of April, 1989. 
Scott W. Christensen, Esq. R. Phil Ivie, Esq. 
Hanson, Epperson & Smith Ivie & Young 
P. O. Box 2970 P. O. Box 672 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 Provo, UT 84603 
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P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (802) 377-4991 
Q:Rhod-Jud.lo 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN M. FRY and JUDITH L. FRY, 
Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WILLIAM C. PETERSEN, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 64,555 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing before the Court sitting with 
a jury on November 28-30, 1988, and the Court having heard the Motion of plaintiff's 
counsel for a directed verdict and having granted the same by reason of the evidence 
presented, and the jury having heretofore resolved the question of damages regarding 
plaintiff's injuries herein, and after good faith presentation of the evidence by both 
plaintiff and defendant, being fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; the Court does now make and 
enter the following Judgment against defendants John M Fry and Judith L. Fry: 
JUDGMENT 
The Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against defendants 
John M. Fry and Judith L. Fry in the amount of $21,000.00 for special damages, 
together with accrued interest on said special damages from the date of the subject 
accident, December 11, 1982, until the date of judgment, at the rate of eight percent 
(8%), and for general damages in the amount of $29,000.00, with interest to accrue on 
the total judgment at the rate of twelve percent per annum (12%), plus court costs 
thereafter. A 
DATED this J^ day of > f e f 
/ 
_, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
BOYS' L. PARK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to 
the following, postage prepaid, this / day of , 1989. 
Scott W. Christensen, Esq. R. Phil Ivie, Esq. 
Hanson, Epperson & Smith Ivie & Young 
P. O. Box 2970 P. O. Box 672 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 Provo, UT 84603 
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EXPLANATION OF ACCIDENT SCENE DIAGRAMS 
The scale on the initial drawings was 1" =10'. The scale on 
these reductions is approximately 1" =33'. 
Exhibit 1 shows the resting place of the vehicles after the 
accident. "F" indicates Fry's pickup and "P" indicates the 
Petersen Volkswagen. (Tr. 11-28-88 p. 50.) 
Exhibit 10 shows the probable path of travel of the vehicles 
leading to the collision. "POI" indicates the point of impact. 
(Tr. 11-29-88 p. 165.) The heavy black line from the cross-walk 
to the point of impact indicates the approximate length of the skid 
marks. (Id. p. 165.) The ".96" reflects the testimony of Newell 
Knight of the travel time of the Volkswagen while laying down the 
skid marks. (Id.) The remainder of the heavy black line (next to 
"1.5") reflects Mr. Knight's testimony of the distance the 
Volkswagen traveled from the point of perception of the Fry vehicle 
to the application of the brakes (i.e., the reaction time). (Id. 
at 177.) 
The wavy line is an error. fid, at 177-78.) 
APPENDIX "D" 
Utah R. C i v . P. 5 0 . 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 50 
Rule 50, Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A party who moves 
for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may 
offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having 
reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not 
been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a 
waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for 
directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific 
ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed 
verdict is effective without any assent of the jury. 
fb) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whenever a mo-
tion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for 
any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to 
the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised "by the 
motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has 
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and amy judgment 
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his 
motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party, 
within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in 
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial 
may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the 
alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to 
stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the 
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict 
was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested 
verdict had been directed or may order a new trial. 
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant of motion. 
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided 
for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on 
the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be 
granted" if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall spec-
ify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the 
motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon 
does not affect the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new 
trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on 
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has other-
wise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally 
denied, the respondent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if 
the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in 
accordance with the order of the appellate court. 
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant 
to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. 
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respon-
dent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate 
court concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict If the appellate court reverses the judgment, 
nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is 
entitled to a new trial, or firom directing the trial court to determine whether a 
new trial shall be granted. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is identical 
to Rule 50, F.R.C.P. 
